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Symposium. The Seat Belt Defense in Practice
THE SEAT BELT DEFENSE-STATE OF
THE LAW
JOEN J. KIRCHER*
INTRODUCTION
The question of whether a plaintiff in an automobile personal
injury action should be barred from recovery or have his damages re-
duced because he failed to make use of available automotive seat belts
has been under consideration for less than a decade.' Despite the recent
origin of the "seat belt defense," a good deal of attention has been given
to the topic in law reviews and other legal periodicals. 2 The nature and
elements of the defense were fully explained in a Defense Research
Institute monograph on the subject. 3 However, some misconceptions
as to the status of the case law construing it appear to have developed
since the original monograph was published. The purpose of this article
is to analyze the case law and re-examine the nature and elements of
the seat belt defense as they relate to the cases.
It should be noted that the general term "seat belt" refers to many
restraint devices other than the familiar lap belt. The term as used here-
in includes the shoulder strap-lap belt combination, which is standard
on newer vehicles, as well as such less frequently used devices as the
harness type of restraint. The seat belt defense is equally applicable to
all automobile restraint devices currently available, as well as those
which may be developed in the future.
Thirty-six reported decisions have been found in which the defense
was considered, but these were concerned with the law of only twenty-
three jurisdictions. 4 Therefore, at least as far as "appellate" courts are
concerned, the seat belt defense has not been considered in over one-
half of the jurisdictions. The highest appellate courts of only five states
and one Canadian province have been called upon to consider the de-
*Associate Research Director, Defense Research Institute, Milwaukee, Wis-
consin, B.A., Marquette University, 1960; J.D., Marquette University Law
School, 1963, member, Milwaukee, Wisconsin State, and American Bar Associ-
ations.
I The origin of the defense can be traced to the case of Stockinger v. Dunisch,
Cir. Ct., Sheboygan Co., Wisconsin (1964). See 5 FOR THE DEFENSE 78 (1964)
2 See Bibliography at 227 infra.
3 J. Kircher, The Seat Belt Defense, (Defense Research Institute Monograph,
Sept. 1967).
4 See Table of Cases at 226 vifra
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fense with three of these approving it,s two rejecting it,6 and one failing
to consider its merits due to other factors involved in the case'
There are basically three approaches which a defendant may take in
urging a court to adopt the seat belt defense:
1. It may be alleged that the plaintiff's failure to make use of an
available seat belt constitutes negligence per se thus barring
him from recovery.
2. It may be alleged that in not making use of an available seat
belt, the plaintiff did not conform to the general standard of
conduct which would be followed by a reasonable man of ordi-
nary prudence under similar circumstances, and therefore:
a. He should be found guilty of contributory negligence and
be barred from all recovery; or
b. He should not be allowed to recover damages for those
injuries which belts would have prevented and have his
damages diminished for those injuries which belts would
have made less severe.
It would be meaningless and misleading merely to list the cases on
the subject in categories labeled "defense accepted" or "defense re-
jected." In the majority of cases the courts have either considered only
one of the possible approaches to the defense or have not found it neces-
sary to consider the merits of the defense because of other factors in
the case. In the latter grouping are included those cases in which the
pleadings did not raise the defense ;" the fact that the plaintiff was not
using belts was not established ;9 the evidence did not establish that the
injuries would have been prevented or made less severe by belt use ;1°
or the court was not asked to instruct the jury on the seat belt issue.:"
While in each of these latter cases the defendant did not prevail in his
attempt to perfect the defense, the assertion that these cases rejected
every possible approach to the defense would be a gross exaggeration.
With these cases now properly classified, it becomes important to ex-
amine the decisions which have reached the merits of at least one ap-
5 Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626 (1967) ; Sams v. Sams, 247
S.C. 467, 148 S.E.2d i54 (1966); Yuan v. Farstad, 62 W.W.R.(n.s.) 645 (B.
C. 1967).
c Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 160 S.E.2d 65 (1968) ; Robinson v. Lewis, 457
P.2d 483 (Ore. 1969).
7Brown v. Bryan, 419 S.W.2d 62 (Mo. 1967).8 Lentz v. Schafer, 404 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1968).
9 Fontenot v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 217 So. 2d 702 (La. App. 1969);
Schomer v. Madigan, 120 Ill. App.2d 107, 225 N.E.2d 620 (1970).10 Barry v. Coca-Cola Co., 99 N.J. Super. 270, 239 A.2d 273 (1967); Bertsch v.
Spears, 20 Ohio App.2d 137, 252 N.E.2d 194 (1969); Cierpisz v. Singleton,
247 Md. 215, 230 A.2d 629 (1967) ; Jones v. Dague, 252 S.C. 261, 166 S.E.2d
99 (1969) ; Kavanagh v. Butorac, 140 Ind. App. 139, 221 N.E.2d 824 (1966);
Myles v. Lee, 209 So. 2d 533 (La. App. 1968); Simpson v. Renman, Civ. No.
332 (N. D. Ind., October 25, 1967); Tom Brown Drilling Co. v. Nieman, 418
S.W.2d 337 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967); Turner v. Pfluger, 407 F.2d 648 (7th Cir.
1969) ; Glover v. Daniels, 310 F. Supp. 750 (E. D. Miss. 1970).
11 Brown v. Bryan, note 7 supra.
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proach to the defense so as to be able to determine what the courts have
actually said on the subject.
NEGLIGENCE Per Se
If one thing has become clear about the seat belt defense as a result
of decided cases, it is that, absent a statute making belt use mandatory,
courts will not find a person guilty of contributory negligence as a mat-
ter of law for non-use. This view has been taken by all of the courts
that have considered this particular approach to the defense. 12
In 1967 there were thirty-two states which had statutes requiring the
installation of seat belt equipment in new vehicles. 3 More state action
regarding seat belt installation was, without doubt, precluded by the
enactment of the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards which be-
came effective on January 1, 1968.14 One of the standards mandates
the installation of an approved set of seat belts for each seat position
in a new vehicle, thus making the number of belts dependent upon the
vehicle's passenger capacity.' 5 Neither the federal standards nor the
state statutes, except for very limited situations,", makes the use of
available seat belts mandatory for vehicle passengers. Although legisla-
tion for general, mandatory use has been proposed," apparently only
one municipality has enacted an ordinance to this effect.'
The view of the courts on the issue of whether a seat belt installa-
tion statute makes non-use negligence per se is well illustrated by the
Wisconsin case of Bentzler v. Braun.'9 Even though the court approved
12 Bentzler v. Braun, note 5 supra; Bertsch v. Spears. note 10 supra; Dillon v.
Humphreys, 56 Misc.2d 211, 288 N.Y.S.2d 14 (Sup. Ct. 1968); Cierpisz v.
Singleton, note 10 supra; Jones v. Dague, note 10 supra; Kavanagh v. Butorac,
note 10 supra; Miller v. Miller, note 6 supra; Remington v. Arndt, 28 Conn.
Super. 289, 259 A.2d 145 (1969); Robinson v. Lewis, note 6 supra; Roman-
kewiz v. Black, 16 Mich. App. 119, 167 N.W.2d 606 (1969); Tom Brown
Drilling Co. v. Nieman, note 10 supra.
13 For a list of state installation statutes, see The Seat Belt Defense, note 3
supra at 21.
14 32 Fed. Reg. 2408 (1967).
15 Id. at 2415, Standard No. 208, S.3.1.
1' See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 27304 (Supp. 1970) (use required of driver and
passengers in training vehicle) ; R. I. GEN. LAWs ANN. § 31-33-41 (1968)
(use required of drivers of every "jitney, bus, private bus, school bus, track-
less trolley coach, and authorized emergency vehicle, when operated upon a
highway"). A very recent and important development was announced in a
July 8, 1970 press release of the Federal Highway Administration. New
regulations of the agency require installation of seat belts at the driver's
seats of all buses, trucks and truck tractors used in interstate commerce which
are built after July 1, 1971. Older vehicles-manufactured after January 1,
1965-must be retrofitted with seat belts by July 1, 1972. The regulations
further provide for mandatory use of the seat belt while such a vehicle is be-
ing driven.
'7 See, e.g., Defense Research Institute Special Report, Responsible Reform-
A Program to Improve the Liability Reparation System at 10 (Oct. 1969).
Is In 1966 the city of Brooklyn, Ohio enacted an ordinance requiring all persons
riding in motor vehicles operated within the city to make use of available seat
belts. See 10 FOR THE DEFENSE 27 (1969).
19 Note 5 supra.
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of another approach toward the defense, it rather summarily dismissed
the negligence per se argument:
It seems apparent that the Wisconsin legislation, which does
not require by its terms the use of seat belts, cannot be considered
a safety statute in a sense that it is negligence per se for an oc-
cupant of an automobile to fail to use available seat belts."
Since other courts have dismissed this approach to the defense with the
same sort of dispatch, it is apparent that defense counsel will be wasting
his time in attempting to have a court rule that non-use in the face of
a mere installation statute is negligence as a matter of law. This was
the position taken by the first DRI monograph on the subject:
The conclusions reached by these courts seem reasonable.
Without a showing of more legislative intent than is presented by
a mere installation statute, it would appear that there is presently
no legislative standard of conduct as to seat belt use.21
It should be noted, however, that in those few instances noted earlier
in which mandates for belt use have been made law, the negligence
per se approach would have merit.
In addition to legislative standards of conduct as set forth in so-
called "safety statutes," courts have, on their own, established certain
standards of conduct and made deviation from them negligence as a
matter of law. One example is the ruling that falling asleep behind the
wheel of a moving vehicle is negligence per se.22
The theory that a court will adopt a rule that the non-use of avail-
able belts is negligence as a matter of law appears to lead to the same
dead-end as does the use of a similar argument based upon an installa-
tion statute.23 The rejection of this argument seems reasonable. A hard
and fast rule on the effect of the use or non-use of seat belts would be
ill-advised due to the many circumstances which arise in auto travel:
Such rules may be useful to fix a standard for the unusual,
normal case, but they a hindrance to any just decision in the large
number of unusual situations presenting new factors which may
affect the standard. A standard which requires only conduct pro-
portionate to the circumstances and the risk seldom, if ever, can
be made a matter of absolute rule.2 4
COMMION LAW RULES
With the first approach to the seat belt defense disposed of-at
least as far as the current state of the law is concerned-we may now
20 34 Wis.2d at 385, 149 N.W.2d at 639.
21 The Seat Belt Defense, note 3 supra at 12.
22 See, e.g., Theisen v. Milwaukee Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 18 Wis.2d 91, 118 N.W.2d
140 (1962).23 See, e.g., Brown v. Kendrick, 192 So. 2d 49 (Fla. App. 1966); Kavanagh v.
Butoric, note 10 supra; Lipscomb v. Diamiani, 226 A.2d 914 (Del. Super.-
1967).
24 W. PROSSER, TORTS § 37 at 212 (3d ed. 1964).
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turn to the consideration which courts have given to the argument that,
under the circumstances of a given case, a reasonable man of ordinary
prudence would have made use of available belts.
Before the cases which have considered this matter can be examined,
it should be noted that five legislatures have attempted to preclude the
courts of their states from ever considering the issue. In seat belt instal-
lation statutes that have been enacted in Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, Ten-
nessee and Virginia are to be found provisions that the failure to use
seat belts shall not be considered as negligence, or that proof of the
lack of their use is inadmissible in any civil action for personal injury
damages.2 5 In addition to showing the foresight of legislators in these
states who are also members of the plaintiff's bar, the fact that these
provisions were deemed necessary strongly indicates that without them,
non-use would be considered contributory negligence. Legislators are
not prone to engage in perfuctory exercises in the enactment of statutes
that have the proverbial trapdoor in a rowboat. Unless the validity of
these statutory prohibitions is to be attacked, any assertion of the seat
belt defense in these five states is subject to being stricken.
CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT
In considering various aspects of the defense, several courts have
found it necessary to note that plaintiff's failure to wear seat belts could
not be considered to be a cause of the accident at issue.2 6 This might
appear to some to be an academic observation, since in only a few rare
instances could non-use be a cause of the collision. However, the fact
that lack of belt use did cause the collision is important in some juris-
dictions. In Remington v. Arndt,27 the court rejected the idea that non-
use amounted to contributory negligence which would bar the action:
It is, therefore, obvious that the defendant cannot claim that the
plaintiff was contributorily negligent in the sense that his conduct
was a contributing cause of the collision between the Arndt ve-
hicle and the defendant's vehicle. The defendant's claim is, rather,
that the plaintiff's conduct caused the plaintiff to sustain injuries
which he would not have sustained if he had fastened his seat
belt. The distinction between these two phases of a plaintiff's
alleged negligence has been long recognized in this state . 2
The court went on to cite the case of Smithwick v. Hall & Upson Co.,29
25 IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.445 (1970); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 29 § 1368A(SuPP. 1970); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.85 (Supp. 1970); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 59-930 (1968) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-309.1 (1967).26 Barry v. Coca-Cola Co., note 10 supra; Dillon v. Humphreys, note 12 supra;
Fontenot v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y., note 9 supra; Lawrence v. West-
chester Fire Ins. Co., 213 So. 2d 784 (La. App. 1968) ; Miller v. Miller, note
6 supra; Myles v. Lee, note 10 supra; Noth v. Scheurer, 285 F. Supp. 81(E.D. N.Y. 1968); Remington v. Arndt, note 12 supra; Turner v. Pfluger,
note 10 supra.
27 Note 12 supra.
28 28 Conn. Super. at _ . 259 A.2d at 145.
2921 A. 924 (Conn. 1890).
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in which it was held that to defeat recovery, the conduct of the plaintiff
must contribute to the happening of the event which caused the injury
and not merely increase or add to the extent of the loss. In Smithwick
the court did note that an act which increases the amount of loss or
damage may effect the amount of damages recovered. However, in
Remington, the court did not reach that issue because it was only con-
sidering a demurrer to a narrowly defined defense:
He has, instead, relied upon the bare allegation that the plaintiff
was negligent in that he failed to fasten his seat belt and that
injury. At the trial, the defendant's proof might be limited to
the narrow allegation that the plaintiff did not fasten his seat belt,
negligence to "specify the negligent acts or omissions on which he
relies." Proof of this narrow allegation would not constitute
proof of negligence, and, accordingly, the present allegations in
the second defense do not spell out an omission to act, which,
without proof of other unalleged circumstances, would bar the
action or mitigate damages.30
Therefore, this case cannot be classified as rejecting the seat belt de-
fense, but only one of its limited aspects. Other cases have also raised
the point that, for recovery to be defeated in a seat belt situation evi-
dence would have to establish that failure to make use of belts was a
cause of the collision.3 1 These cases would point to the need for defense
counsel to plead the seat belt defense in such a manner as to allege that
belt use would have prevented or reduced the severity of the injuries,
and thus, assert that damages should be reduced. The need for this
approach to the defense would appear obvious even in those contribu-
tory negligence states in which the distinction between cause of the
collision and cause of the injuries is not recognized. The courts in these
states appear loath to completely bar a plaintiff's recovery based on the
seat belt defense, even if perfectly pleaded and clearly proved-especial-
ly in those cases in which belts could have prevented only some injury
but not all.
3 2
CAUSE OF INjiUiES-REDUCTION OF DAMAGES
From what has been discussed thus far, it is clear that defense coun-
sel will have very limited success in attempting to use the seat belt
defense to completely bar the plaintiff's recovery. However, even in
3028 Conn. Super. at _ 259 A.2d at 146.
31 Barry v. Coca-Cola Co., note 10 supra; Noth v. Scheurer, note 26 supra. Both
noted but did not decide whether, if properly raised by pleadings and estab-
lished by proof, damages could be reduced because non-use increased the
severity of the injuries.
32 See, e.g., Brown v. Kendrick, note 23 supra; Dillon v. Humphreys, note 12
supra; Lawrence v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., note 26 supra; Lipscomb v.
Diamiani, note 23 supra; Miller v .Miller, note 6 supra; Robinson v. Lewis,
note 6 supra; Romankewiz v. Black, note 12 supra; Woods v. Smith, 296 F.
Supp. 1128 (N.D. Fla. 1969).
33 But see General Motors v. Walden, 406 F.2d 606 (10th Cir. 1969) (instruc-
tion that failure to wear seat belts may constitute total bar upheld).
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those jurisdictions in which contributory negligence is a complete bar
to recovery, it appears that one approach to the seat belt defense re-
mains open. It is dependent upon the ability to plead and prove that
non-use by the plaintiff increased the extent of his injuries and damages.
This approach also has utility in comparative negligence states but, for
the sake of clarity, its application there will be considered separatelyA4
In contributory negligence states it appears that there are two pos-
sible avenues upon which to pursue a defense which is closely akin to
mitigation of damages. The first is under what has been referred to as
the doctrine of avoidable consequences. Prosser describes the rule in
the following terms:
Closely allied to the doctrine of contributory negligence is the
rule of "avoidable consequences," which denies recovery for any
damages which could have been avoided by reasonable conduct
on the part of the plaintiff. Both rest upon the same fundamental
policy of making recovery depend upon the plaintiff's proper care
for the protection of his own interests, and both require of him
only the standard of the reasonable man under the circum-
stances. 35
The other approach is known as the "apportionment of damages"
rule. This is to be found in the Restatement which, after discussing
avoidable consequences, states:
Such apportionment may also be made where the antecedent
negligence of the plaintiff is found not to contribute in any way
to the original accident or injury, but to be a substantial contrib-
uting factor in increasing the harm which ensues. There must of
course be satisfactory evidence to support such a finding, and
the court may properly refuse to permit the apportionment on the
basis of mere speculation. 36
The distinction between the avoidable consequences and "apportionment
of damages" appears to be merely artificial.37
The possibility of some form of damage reduction being applied to a
seat belt non-use situation has been noted in a number of decisions.
In most, the courts found it unnecessary to rule on the merits of the
34 See page 188 infra.
35 W. PROSsER, TORTS 433 (3d ed. 1964).
36 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 465, Comment c (1965); the black letter
rule on apportionment of damages is set forth at § 433A of the Restatement as
follows:
§ 433A. Apportionment of Harm to Causes(1) Damages for harm are to be apportioned among two or more
causes where
(a) there are distinct harms or
(b) there is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution
of each cause to a single harm.(2) Damages for any other harm cannot be apportioned among
two or more causes.
3 See page 188 infra.
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matter.-8 The reason these courts took no action was that other factors
in the case made consideration and decision unnecessary.3 9
There are other cases in which courts have considered the merits
of the damage reduction approach. In Barry v. Coca-Cola Co.,40 the
court rather summarily dismissed the avoidable consequences rule as
being inapplicable to a seat belt non-use situation, but intimated that
the "apportionment of damages" rule might be applied under proper
circumstances. In Kavanagh v. Butorac,4' which is often erroneously
cited as having completely rejected the defense, the court stated:
We recognize possibility of the doctrine [avoidable consequences]
applying in some future date and in some matter where the cir-
cumstances are clearer than the instant case in showing that some
part of the injury would not have occurred except for the fact
that plaintiff failed to avoid the consequence of the tort by not
fastening his seat belt.42
There are three cases in which the courts have held that the jury
should consider the non-use of seat belts in relation to the damage
issue, as opposed to the issue of liability. In none of them, however,
did the courts specify whether this approach should follow avoidable
consequences or the "apportionment of damages" rule. In Mount v.
McClellan,43 the court stated:
The use, or non-use of seat belts, and expert testimony if any,
in relation thereto, is a circumstance which the trier of facts may
consider, together with all other facts in evidence, in arriving at
its conclusion as to whether the plaintiff has exercised due care,
not only to avoid injury to himself, but to mitigate any injury he
would likely sustain. However, this element should be limited to
the damage issue of the case and should not be considered by the
trier of facts in determining the liability issue.44
Courts in Texas45 and Connecticut 4 6 have taken similar views.
There are courts which have rejected the possible application of
damage reduction to a seat belt non-use situation. Some have ruled
against the use of the avoidable consequences doctrine and have also
found that a reasonable man of ordinary prudence would not make use
38 Bertsch v. Spears, note 10 supra; Cierpisz v. Singleton, note 10 supra; Dillon
v. Humphreys, note 12 supra; Fontenot v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y., note
9 supra; Jones v. Dague, note 10 supra; Noth v. Scheurer, note 26 supra;
Remington v. Arndt, note 12 supra; Schomer v. M[adigan, note 9 supra;
Simpson v. Renman, note 10 supra; Glover v. Daniels, note 10 supra.
39 In many cases there was no evidence to show a causal connection between
non-use and the injuries sustained.
40 Note 10 supra.
41d.
42 140 Ind. App. at 149, 221 N.E.2d at 830.
4391 Ill. App.2d 1, 234 N.E.2d 329 (1968).
44 Id. at 5, 234 N.E.2d at 331. See also Sams v. Sams, note 5 supra; Husted v.
Refuse Removal Service, 26 Conn. Super. 494, 227 A.2d 433 (1967).
45 Sonnier v. Ramsey, 424 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).46Uresky v. Fedora, 27 Conn. Super. 498, 245 A.2d 393 (1968).
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of available belts unless put on notice of some special specifiic peril not
normally associated with ordinary vehicular travel.4 7 Two have taken
only the latter position.48 Since the sine qua non of the damage reduc-
tion phase of the seat belt defense is the finding that a reasonable man
of ordinary prudence would wear available belts,49 the reasoning com-
mon to these cases must be carefully examined. This can be done by
an analysis of the case of Miller v. Miller 0 which is clearly the lead
case in opposition to the defense.
In Miller the plaintiff was a passenger in his own car. It entered a
sharp curve, left the road and overturned. The plaintiff received a back
injury as a result of the collision and commenced an action against the
driver of his car. As part of her answer, the defendant alleged that
the vehicle was equipped with seat belts and the plaintiff did not use the
set of belts that was available for him. She further alleged that the
plaintiff would not have been injured had he used the available belts.
The trial court struck the defense, precluding the introduction of any
evidence to support it and an appeal was taken.
In considering the safety belt defense the North Carolina Supreme
Court first looked at the question of whether the state's seat belt instal-
lation statute made non-use negligence per se. It ruled that the instal-
lation statute did not create such a result. 51 As noted previously,52 this
approach is reasonable both under a mere installation statute and in the
face of a claim that the court should establish a judicial standard that
non-use always amounts to negligence as a matter of law. However,
the court used this ruling to proceed further:
The conclusion that a motorist is negligent whenever he rides
upon the highway with his seat belt unbuckled can be supported
only by a premise that no reasonably prudent person would travel
the highway without using an available seat belt. If this be true,
every failure to use an available seat belt would be negligence
per se .... 53
The fallacies in this statement are obvious. The proponents of the
seat belt defense do not claim that a motorist is negligent whenever
he rides without belts or that non-use is negligence per se or, for that
matter, that a reasonable man of ordinary prudence would never travel
47 Lipscomb v. Diamiani, note 23 supra; Miller v. Miller, note 6 supra; Roman-
kewiz v. Black, note 12 supra; Woods v. Smith, note 32 supra.45 Dillon v. Humphreys, note 12 supra; Robinson v. Lewis, note 6 supra. For
earlier decisions interpreting Oregon law on the seat belt defense, see Robin-
son v. Bone, 285 F. Supp. 423 (D. Ore. 1968) ; Siburg v. Johnson, 439 P.2d
865 (Ore. 1968).
-9 See W. PROSSER, note 35 supra.
50 Note 6 supra; Romankewiz, Woods and Robinson, notes 47 and 48 supra,
all rely on rea!oning of Miller. See Kircher, Miller v. Miller: The Safety
Belt Defense, 35 INs. COUNSEL J. 432 (1968).
51 See cases cited at note 12 supra.
52 See discussion at page 174 supra.
53 273 N.C. at - 160 S.E.2d at 68.
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the highway without belts. What the court in Miller failed to realize
is that there may be circumstances under which a reasonable man of
ordinary prudence would travel on the highway without having his
available belts buckled. A person whose physician cautioned against
use because of recent abdominal surgery or pregnancy would hardly be
considered prudent if this advice was not followed. What the propo-
nents of the defense have claimed is that a reasonable man of ordinary
prudence would make use of belts in most instances, but that the matter
should be left to the trier of facts to decide because of the many cir-
cumstances involved in highway travel which would make a hard and
fast rule unworkable.54
Seat Belt Acceptance
The court in Miller then set out to establish that a reasonable man
of ordinary prudence would not make use of seat belts unless put on
notice of some special and specific peril not normally associated with
ordinary vehicular travel. It first considered the question of the public
acceptance of seat belts as a safety device and quoted, with apparent
approval, the statement of a student law review author:
[T]he issue of the social utility of the use of seat belts is definite-
ly not clarified in the minds of the public and the courts. Doubts
remain as to whether seat belts cause injury, and the real useful-
ness of the seat belt in preventing injuries has not become pub-
lic knowledge.55
The court's acceptance of such a statement at face value is almost as
incomprehensible as the reason which led the student author to make
it. One would have to be deaf and blind to be unaware that the public
has been exposed to one of the greatest safety education campaigns on
record regarding the effectiveness of seat belts. Radio, television, the
printed media and bill boards all carry some form of the "Buckle Up
For Safety" message with regularity.
Evidence that the public does appreciate the effectiveness of safety
belts as a safety device comes from a survey of drivers and occupants
in over 1,700,000 cars which was conducted by the Auto Industries
Highway Safety Committee.56 In the cars which had belts installed,
only 10.3 percent of the persons questioned said that they never used
belts under any circumstances. While some might question the honesty
of respondents, their answers surely would have been different if they
were not convinced that belts had any utility. In view of this it is
strange that the court would accept a statement, particularly an unsup-
ported one, that the real usefullness of seat belts has not become public
knowledge.
54 The Seat Belt Defense, note 3 supra and discussion at page 176 supra.
55Seat Belt Negligence in AutoAmobile Accidents, 1967 Ws. L. REv. 288, 296.56Sixth Annual Seat Belt Installation and Use Survey, Auto Industries Highway
Safety Committee (1966).
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The Miller court seemed impressed with one National Safety Coun-
cil estimate which set the use of seat belts by all passenger car occu-
pants at between 20 and 25 percent. "If the foregoing statistics be cor-
rect," said the court, "the average man does not customarily use his
seat belt."'57 Whether the statistics are correct or nearly so is immaterial
in this context. Statistics on cigarette sales since the issuance of the
Surgeon General's report on smoking and cancer, and continuing pub-
licity thereafter, would indicate that the average smoker is not heeding
the "Smoking Kills" warning. Would the North Carolina court (irre-
spective of the fact that it is in a tobacco state) use those statistics to
say that a person who starts to smoke or continues smoking in the
face of the conclusive evidence on the cancer link is acting as would a
reasonable man of ordinary prudence under the circumstances? It is
just the propensity of the "average" man to adopt an "it can't happen
to me" approach toward his own safety that gives strength to the view
that community customs and usages often result from the kind of inad-
vertence, carelessness, indifference and corner-cutting that is normally
associated with negligence.50 Custom is not conclusive simply because
it is custom; it must meet the challenge of "learned reason," and be
given only the evidentiary weight that the situation deserves.5 9 If this
were not the case, the North Carolina court could have decided the
issue by simply polling its members to determine how many custom-
arily used seat belts. The fact that certain members of the court may
not ordinarily use belts could have had a bearing on the outcome of the
case-no one likes to be forced to declare his own habits unreasonab!e.
Seat Belt Effectiveness
The court next turned its consideration to the question of the effec-
tiveness of safety belts in preventing injury and death resulting from
auto accidents. The claim that seat belts are not effective or might
themselves be dangerous is by far the weakest attack against the defense.
The effectiveness of belts has been clearly demonstrated.6 ° Not much
time needs to be devoted here to the subject as a result. However, it
is important to note the strategy emp!oyed by the court in its attempt
to discount the effectiveness of belt use.
The court began with the following statement:
Many people fail to use them because of the fear of entrapment
in a burning or submerged car.61 [emphasis added].
The writer is unaware of any authoritative survey of public attitudes
57273 N.C. at , 160 S.E. 2d at 69.
58 V. PROSSER, note 24 supra, § 33 at 170.
59 Id.
6o See Huelke, Practical Defense Problems-The Expert's View, page 203 infra;
Snyder, The Seat Belt as a Cause of Injury, page 211 infra; The Seat Belt
Defense, note 3, supra at 7.
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which supports such an unqualified assertion. Likewise, the authority
cited by the court for this premise is silent as to the source of such a
general statement of fact.6 2 However, to whatever extent such fear may
exist, it is unfounded. A report of a study of this subject indicates that
fire occours in only two-tenths of one percent of all injury-producing
accidents, and submersion in only three-tenths of one percent.623 It also
noted that a person wearing a seat belt in these types of accidents may
have a better chance of survival than one who is unbelted. The report
points to the fact that a person wearing a belt is more likely to remain
conscious after the collision and is thereby in a better position to remove
himself from the area of danger.
Throughout Miller the court quotes at great length and with appar-
ent approval from an article highly critical of the seat belt defense
written by J. Murry Kleist who specializes in plaintiffs' litigation.64
In discussing the effectiveness of seat belts, the court quotes Kleist's
comment that belts are of limited value and may cause more injuries
than they prevent. Kleist, in turn, cites three authorities to support
that position. Two of the authorities discuss the medical aspects of the
seat belt as a cause of injury.62 5 Contrary to the position which Kleist
attributes to them, these studies conclude that while seat belts may
cause some injuries (usually in high speed collisions), the injuries sus-
tained would have been more severe had belts not been used.66 In fact,
the author of one of the studies cited by Kleist states:
It does not reasonably follow that the use of restraining devices
should be discarded because they can cause injury. This blanket
condemnation is favored by those who are uninformed or do not
choose to use seat belts.6
7
Kleist's third authority6 s based his conclusions as to the effectiveness of
seat belts upon experiments involving simulated collisions conducted
prior to 1958. The early origin of this study and the fact that numer-
ous, more recent studies have come to completely opposite results point
to its limited value.6 9 Kleist did not see fit to distinguish the more re-
61 273 N.C. at , 160 S.E.2d at 69.
62 Annot., Automobile Occupants' Failure to Use Seat Belt as Contributory
Negligence, 15 A.L.R.3d 1428, 1430 (1967).63 Gagen, Seat Belts: No Longer Why, But Why Not?, 38 ToDAY's HEALTH 26
(1960).
64 Kleist, The Seat Belt Defense-An Exercise in Sophistry, 18 HASTINGs L. J.
613 (1967).65 Rubovits, Traumatic Rupture of the Pregnant Uterus froin "Seat Belt" In-
jury, 90 Aii. J. OBST. & GYN. 828 (1964) ; Fisher, Injury Produced by Seat
Belts, Report of 2 Cases, 7 J. OF OCCUPATIONAL MED. 211 (1965).
66 See also Snyder at page 211 infra.
67 Fisher, note 64 supra.
68 White, The Role of Safety Belts in the Motorist's Safety, 9 CrINCAL ORTHO-
PEDICS 317 (1957).
69 See J. Kircher, The Seat Belt Defense, note 3 supra at 37; Snyder page
211 infra.
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cent studies or, for that matter, the fact that the organized plaintiff's
bar has advocated full seat belt use by motorists."0
It seems strange that the legislatures of thirty-two states, the Con-
gress of the United States and even the plaintiff's bar would advocate
installation or use of seat belts if, as claimed by Kleist, they were of
limited value or could cause more rather than fewer injuries in many
crash conditions. In the final analysis, a review of all the studies of
the effectiveness of seat belts supports the wisdom of the position
taken by the Wisconsin Supreme Court:
While it is apparent that . . . statistics cannot be used to
predict the extent or gravity of injuries resulting from particular
automobile accidents involving persons using seat belts as com-
pared to those who are not using them, it is obvious that, on the
average, persons using seat belts are less likely to sustain injury
and if injured, the injuries are likely to be less serious.7 1
Applying The Reasonable Man Standard
With the initial phases of the Miller opinion disposed of, the heart
of the issue can be reached-is there a common law duty, based on the
standard of the ordinary man of reasonable prudence, to make use of
available seat belts? Can the damage reduction approach to the defense
be used in this regard? As noted earlier, Miller rejected this approach.
In determining what a reasonable man would have done under the
circumstances, the reasonableness of the risk that a party incurred by
his conduct is judged by weighing the importance of the interest he is
seeking to advance against the probability that his conduct may cause
him harm and the probable severity of that harm. 2 Seat belts are clear-
ly an effective safety device and this information is common public
knowledge. Therefore, in a seat belt situation, the question becomes
whether a reasonable man of ordinary prudence possessed of this
knowledge and considering the probability of being involved in an ac-
cident and the probable severity of the harm to himself as a result of
such an accident would make use of available belts for his own pro-
tection.
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Is the probability of being involved in an accident on any given trip
so great that, standing alone, the reasonable man of ordinary prudence,
after considering the probability, would use an available seat belt?
An unqualified "yes" to such a question would only beg it. It is
possible for a person to be found guilty of contributory negligence for
failing to take precautions to avoid a possible future harm.73 However,
70 Stop Murder by Motorists at 9 (American Trial Lawyers Association Mono-
graph, January 1966).
71 Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d at 386, 149 N.W.2d at 640.
72 W. PROSSER, note 24 supra, § 64 at 429.
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) ToRTs § 466, comment g (1965).
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a person is not expected to guard against harm from those events which
it is not reasonable to anticipate, or which are so unlikely to happen
that the risk, although recognizable, would commonly be disregarded.7 4
Although most auto trips do not result in accidents, still the probability
of an accident occurring is real. It is this probability that gives rise
to a duty to use reasonable means to avoid or mitigate the harm that may
result from an accident. The probability of an accident is illustrated by
the fact that state and federal legislation for safer roads, cars, driver
education, periodic vehicle inspection, implied consent laws, stricter
licensing policies, and a multitude of other safety-oriented legislation
all point to the growing concern over auto accidents and their toll in
loss of life as well as human suffering and economic damage. The auto
accident and its effects have indeed become a national problem.75
SEVERITY OF HARM
The Kleist article, previously mentioned, attacked the seat belt de-
fense on two basic points. He contends that the remote probability of
being involved in an auto accident and the fact that a person has the
right to assume that others will exercise proper care, remove the need
to take protective measures such as fastening a seat belt. In Miller,
the court also made note of the fact that a person is entitled to assume
others will use due care for his safety and their own.7 6
Arguments such as these disregard several important factors. If a
risk is an appreciable one and the possible consequences are serious,
mathematical chance alone does not control the determination of wheth-
er a risk can be reasonably run. As the gravity of the possible harm
increases, the apparent likelihood of the occurrence of the harm need
be correspondingly less.77 Car-train collisions are far less frequent than
are collisions between autos, yet the prudent motorist proceeds over a
grade crossing with care to observe if a train is near. As noted earlier,
the probability of being involved in an auto accident on any given trip
is appreciable. The grave consequences of auto accidents involving
high-powered vehicles capable of great speeds are matters of common
knowledge of which the courts have taken judicial notice.78
Similarly, the position that one may assume that others will exer-
cise proper care is not absolute. Generally, when the risk is slight, a
person may proceed under this assumption; however, when the risk be-
comes serious, either due to the gravity of possible harm or the likeli-
74 W. PRoSSER, note 24 supra, § 31 at 149.
75 Evidence of the merit of this statement is found in the fact that Congress
authorized the Department of Transportation to conduct a two-year, $1.6
million study of the present auto reparation and insurance systems. PUB. L.
No. 90-313 (May 22, 1968).
76 273 N. C. at _ ,160 S.E.2d at 70.77 W. PROSsER, note 24 supra, § 31 at 151.
78 See, e.g., McConville v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 374,
382-83, 113 N.W.2d 14, 19 (1962).
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hood of its occurrence, reasonable care may demand that occasional
negligence, common among all men, be anticipated.79
The argument that belts need not be used because one has the right
to assume that others will exercise proper care likewise presupposes
that all auto accidents will be caused by negligence of someone other
than the non-user. This is obviously not the case.
Recent highway safety campaigns by national groups have advised
motorists to "watch out for the other guy." They have emphasized
the fact that a motorist should not rely on the assumption that others
will obey the rules of the road. Advertisements in the press, and on
radio and television have warned motorists that if they do not take
precautions and if they rely on the fact that they have the right of
way, they may be in the right, but "dead right." All of the educational
efforts of these various safety organizations would seem to be evidence
of the fact that a reasonable man of ordinary prudence should appre-
ciate the risk involved in automobile travel. Similar educational efforts
regarding the effectiveness of safety belt use would also be evidence of
the fact that a reasonable man of ordinary prudence should realize that
he is much safer and less likely to suffer serious injury if he wears his
belt.80
Although the final determination of whether a reasonable man of
ordinary prudence would use an available seat belt under the circum-
stances of the particular case should be for the jury to determine, a
defendant should be allowed to plead and prove that the plaintiff did
not exercise ordinary care for his own safety and that this was a legal
cause of his injuries and damages."' Although this view was rejected
by the court in Miller and the few cases which follow that decision,S2
the preceding discussion has shown that the rulings in those cases were
based upon a misinterpretation of the facts and the law involved in the
defense.
Proving Causation
Even though it can be shown to the satisfaction of a court and jury
that a reasonable man of ordinary prudence would have made use of
available belts under the circumstances involved in the case at issue,
more is needed for the damage reduction approach to the seat belt
defense to be effective. The defendant must be able to prove that use
of the available belts would have prevented the plaintiff's injuries and
damages or would have made them less severe.8 3
19 W. PROSSER, note 24 supra, § 33 at 174.
80 Bentzler v. Braun, note 5 supra.
81 Sams v. Sams, note 5 supra; Truman v. Vargas, 80 Cal. Rptr. 373 (Cal. App.
1969).
82 Notes 47 and 48 supra.
8 See notes 35 and 36 supra.
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In Miller the court stated:
Should the use of seat belts be required by law, there is little
doubt that the testimony of professional safety experts would be
made available to both plaintiff and defendant. Notwithstanding,
it would probably remain'a matter of conjecture to what extent a
motorist's injuries are attributable to his failure to use a seat
belt and whether, had it been used, other and different injuries
would have resulted. 84
Earlier in its opinion, the court quoted a similar statement by Kleist:
In any given collision, no doctor can say exactly what injuries
would have been suffered had the victim been wearing a seat belt
as compared to those he suffered without it.85
It is, at best, the height of speculation for a court and an attorney not
skilled or schooled in the sciences of medicine, accident reconstruction
or biomechanics to attempt to surmise what experts will be able to es-
tablish after examining the physical evidence. Research indicates that
scientists can determine whether injuries and deaths would have been
prevented had belts been employed. 8 Unquestionably, some cases may
arise in which experts will be unable to determine to a reasonable cer-
tainty what effect seat belt use would have had in preventing injury. In
such cases the trial court could prevent the jury from considering the
seat belt defense. In these situations proper instructions could be given
to caution the jury that the proof was insufficient for them to consider
the matter. However, in a case such as Miller, in which the court is
only asked to consider whether what the defense asserted in the plead-
ings is susceptible to demurrer, the propriety of the court's speculation
as to what competent experts could establish is highly questionable.
As noted earlier, a number of courts have indicated that some form
of damage reduction approach might be applied in a non-use situation
while others have not considered the merits of the approach because
of other factors in the case. 7 These cases clearly indicate that juries
will not be allowed to speculate on the causation issue.88 Therefore,
the defense should not be raised unless competent evidence is available.
The manner of collecting and presenting this evidence will be discussed
in subsequent sections of this symposium.8 9
Avoidable Consequences Distinction
Some courts have questioned whether the avoidable consequences
rule can be used in a seat belt non-use situation because of the manner
84 273 N.C. at - 160 S.E.2d at 73.
85 Kleist, note 64 supra at 615.
86 See Huelke page 203 infra.
87 Notes 38, 40, 41, 43, 45 and 46 supra.
88 Sams v. Sams, note 5 supra; Husted v. Refuse Removal Service, note 44
Supra.89 See Bowman page 191 infra and Huelke page 203 infra.
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in which the rule is customarily applied. They note that generally, con-
tributory negligence applies to negligence on the part of the plaintiff
before any damage or invasion of his rights has occurred, while avoid-
able consequences comes into play after a legal wrong has occurred but
while some damage may still be averted. 90 Since the failure to make use
of seat belts occurs before the collision when a trip is begun, they find
trouble applying the avoidable consequences rule.
Prosser, while noting this customary distinction, believes it places
an entirely artificial emphasis on the moment of impact and pure me-
chanics of causation.91 He states:
It is suggested, therefore, that the doctrines of contributory
negligence and avoidable consequences are in reality the same,
and the distinction which exists is rather one between damages
which are capable of assignment to separate causes, and damages
which are not.
92
It is suggested that this is the more reasonable and practical approach
and that any difference or distinction between the avoidable conse-
quences and the "apportionment of damages" approaches noted earlier
is a matter of form than substance.
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
The bulk of this paper has been involved with a discussion of the
seat belt defense as it may be applied in those states in which contrib-
utory negligence is a complete bar to recovery. However, it is to be
noted that the number of states using the comparative negligence rule
is growing.9 3 It appears that more states may abandon the contributory
negligence complete bar rule in favor of comparative negligence. 94
Since contributory negligence is not automatically a bar to recovery
in a comparative negligence state, it is suggested that courts in those
jurisdictions may be more kindly disposed toward the seat belt defense.
In a comparative negligence state the defense will be aimed at damage
reduction and the courts are familiar with this form of defense ap-
proach. The non-use of seat belts would be classified as passive negli-
gence (a cause of injury or damage) as opposed to active negligence
(a cause of the accident or collision). 95
90 See, e.g., Barry v. Coca-Cola Co., note 10 supra at 276.
91 W. PROSsER, note 24 supra, § 64 at 433.
92 Id., at 434.
93Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi,
New Hampshire, South Dakota, Vermont, Wisconsin and Nebraska have
comparative negligence rules. Puerto Rico and Canada also have comparative
negligence rules.
94See Report of ABA Special Committee on Automobile Accident Reparations
at 74 (June 1969): Defense Research Institute Special Report, Responsible
Reform-A Program to Improve the Liability Reparation System at 23(October 1969).
95 Ghiardi & Hogan, Comparative Negligence-The Wisconsin Ride and Pro-
cedure, 18 DEFENSE L. J. 537, 548 (1969).
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Only three cases have been found from comparative negligence
jurisdictions in which the seat belt defense was considered. In each case
the court either applied the defense to reduce damages or found that the
defense could be applied in a proper case. The leading case is the Wis-
consin Supreme Court decision of Bentzler v. Braun,"6 which has been
discussed in previous sections of this paper. After a thorough exami-
nation of all of the considerations involved in the defense, the court
concluded:
While we agree with those courts that have concluded that it
it not negligent per se to fail to use seat belts where the only sta-
tutory standard is one that requires installation of the seat belts
in the vehicle, we nevertheless conclude that there is a duty,
based on the common law standard of ordinary care, to use avail-
able seat belts independent of any statutory mandateY7
The court was quite clear, however, that for the defense to be applied
so as to result in damage reduction under the state's comparative neg-
ligence rule, a causal connection between non-use and the plaintiff's
injuries and damages would have to be established.
In Kelley v. United States,9" the court applied Mississippi's compar-
ative negligence rule and reduced the plaintiff's damage award by 50
percent because non-use increased the extent of injury:
Significantly, neither Kelley nor his wife had their seat belts
fastened, and it is clear that a fastened seat belt would have pre-
vented Mrs. Kelley from receiving this extensive injury to her
face, head and brain. She was surely guilty of contributory
negligence on such occasion...9
The Canadian province of British Columbia also has a comparative neg-
ligence rule and in Yuan v. Farstad,0 0 a damage award was reduced by
25 percent because a causal connection was established between non-use
and injury. In that case the court followed the reasoning of Bentzler.
SEAT BELTS AND THE PLAINTIFFS' BAR
The writer could not conclude his consideration of the subject of
seat belts without discussing the position of the plaintiffs' bar. At best,
it is highly curious. At one and the same time plaintiffs' lawyers have
criticized the seat belt defense and have questioned the effectiveness of
seat belts as a safety device, 0 :1 while the national organizations of plain-
tiff's lawyers have praised seat belts and urged their use by all motorists
as a means of cutting our tragic highway death and injury tolls. 10 2 In
96 Note 5 supra.
9734 Wis. 2d at 385, 149 N.W.2d at 639.
98 Civ. No. 4094 (S.D. Miss. 1967).
99 Id.
100 Note 5 supra.
101 See Kleist, note 64 supra.
102 Note 70 supra.
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fact, the bi-monthly magazine of the plaintiffs' bar recently carried an
editorial urging legislation which would make use of seat belts man-
datory.
10 3
Individual plaintiffs' lawyers have also seen that seat belts may cre-
ate a situation favorable to a claimant in a personal injury case. In at
least four cases the plaintiff has alleged negligence on the part of the
defendant for failing to provide seat belts in his vehicle. 0 In another,
the plaintiff tried to claim the fact that belts were used was conclusive,
as a matter of law, of the fact that his deceased was in the exercise of
ordinary care at the time of the accident. 105
It is the attempt of the plaintiffs' bar to seek to have the best of all
possible worlds that makes the work of the defense lawyer so interesting.
SUMMARY
From the foregoing discussion it may be seen that the only phase
of the seat belt defense on which the law is settled is that, in the face
of a mere installation statute, non-use of belts is not negligence per se.
Contrary to the assertion of some, the number of courts which have
rejected all phases of the defense is relatively small.'06 However, even
here it may be improper to use the term "rejected all phases" since
Miller and the cases which have followed it state that there may be a
duty on the part of the plaintiff to use available belts if he is put on
notice of some specific danger such as a car door which will not re-
main closed.' 07
There are a number of courts which have accepted one phase of
the defense or have indicated that the defense could be applied in a
proper case.108 However, the vast majority of courts have never been
called upon to consider the seat belt defense, or have been called upon
to do so, but found this unnecessary because of other factors in the case.
Therefore, at best, the law with regard to the seat belt defense can
only be termed unsettled. Yet, from the cases which have been decided,
it is clear that the best approach to the defense is to have it applied to
reduce the plaintiff's damages. In this regard, it is crystal clear that
competent and convincing evidence of the causal connection between
non-use and the injuries and damages sustained is imperative:
[Tihe lifeblood of a legal theory is facts and if there are no facts
supporting the theory, it is error to instruct on that theory.
0 9
103 Stop Murder by Motorists, 6 TRIAL 8 (1969-70).
104 Forse v. Turner, 286 N.Y.S.2d 14 (Sup. Ct. 1968) ; Greyhound Lines, Inc. v.
Superior Ct., 83 Cal. Rptr. 343 (Cal. App. 1970) ; Mortensen v. Southern
Pacific Co., 53 Cal. Rptr. 851 (Cal. App. 1966) ; Tiemeyer v. McIntosh, 176
N.W.2d 819 (Iowa 1970). See also Bowman at page 196 infra, note 29.
105 Deaver v. Hickox, 121 Ill. App.2d 465, 256 N.E.2d 866 (1970).
106 Notes 47 and 48 supra.
107 Id.
108 Notes 40, 41, 43, 45, 46, 88, 96, 98, 100 supra.
1o9 Shore v. Turman 63 Ill. App.2d 315, 321, 210 N.E.2d 232, 235 (1965).
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